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Abstract: 
Using a unique, hand-collected database of all venture-backed firms listed on Germany's 
Neuer Markt, we analyze the history of venture capital financing of these firms before the IPO 
and the behavior of venture capitalists at the IPO. We can detect significant differences in the 
behavior and characteristics of German vs. foreign venture capital firms. The discrepancy in 
the investment and divestment strategies may be explained by the grandstanding phenome-
non, the value-added hypothesis and certification issues. 
German venture capitalists are typically younger and smaller than their counterparts from 
abroad. They syndicate less. The sectoral structure of their portfolios differs from that of for-
eign venture capital firms. We also find that German venture capitalists typically take compa-
nies with lower offering volumes on the market. They usually finance firms in a later stage, 
carry through fewer investment rounds and take their portfolio firms public earlier. In compa-
nies where a German firm is the lead venture capitalist, the fraction of equity held by the 
group of venture capitalists is lower, their selling intensity at the IPO is higher and the com-
mitted lock-up period is longer. 
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This paper deals with the behavior of venture capitalists in Germany and their
exit via initial public o®erings (IPOs), which are generally considered to be the
most pro¯table divestment channel of venture capital ¯rms (see e.g. Bygrave and
Timmons, 1992 and Gompers, 1995). Another reason for our focus on this exit
channel is the easy access to data on venture-backed IPOs in Germany (compared
to venture-backed ¯rms that stay private). The main sources of information are
issuing prospectuses of ¯rms going public. They contain information on the ¯rm,
the structure of its pre-IPO ¯nancing and the preplanned features of the o®ering.
Our analysis is based on a unique hand-collected database of all venture-backed
IPOs on Germany's Neuer Markt throughout its short, but very turbulent history.
The enormous increase in the venture capital (VC) investment activities in Germany
came along with the setting up of the Neuer Markt in March 1997. However, after
a remarkably positive development, particularly in the second half of 1999 and the
¯rst half of 2000, the issuing activities on Germany's Neuer Markt stopped almost
completely in the second half of 2001. Between August 2001 and December 2002
only one ¯rm went public on Germany's Neuer Markt. The Nemax 50 index fell
during one and a half years by more than 90 %. Finally, the Neuer Markt was closed
in June 2003.
We examine the history of the venture capital ¯nancing of ¯rms listed on the Neuer
Markt and analyze the venture capitalists' selling activities in the course of IPOs.
Venture capitalists maintain their shareholdings beyond the IPO. Unfortunately, it
is not possible to document the development of the capital structure after the IPO
with high accuracy. The available databases are very imprecise and contain gaps.
To our knowledge it is impossible to ¯nd out how the divestment process of venture
capitalists in Germany continues after the IPO and the expiration of the lock-up
period. Therefore, we concentrate on the investigation of the pre-IPO venture capital
¯nancing and the behavior of venture capitalists at the IPO.
The existing empirical research on the venture capitalists' exit decisions in Ger-
many and Europe is limited. It may be divided into two main areas. On the one
hand, there are several papers that compare venture-backed and non venture-backed
IPOs: Franzke (2001), Kraus (2002) and Mayer (2001) deal with the underpricing
on Germany's Neuer Markt; Bottazzi and Da Rin (2001) look at the di®erences
in e.g. corporate growth and funds raised (data for European ¯rms); Audretsch
and Lehmann (2002) demonstrate di®erences in growth and the structure of bal-
ance sheets for companies on Germany's Neuer Markt. These studies use publicly
available data. On the other hand, there is empirical research based on an individ-
ual data collection via e.g. questionnaires designed for that purpose. This approach
makes it possible to consider other exit channels for which publicly available data do
not exist. The determinants of the choice of a particular exit channel by the venture
capitalists (trade sale, IPO, liquidation) are analyzed by Schwienbacher (2001) and
1Cumming (2002). Our paper is based on publicly available data but does not deal
with the comparison of venture-backed and non venture-backed IPOs. It considers
the di®erences within the group of venture-backed IPOs.
Our contribution to the empirical research is threefold. Firstly, we collected a unique
database of the pre-IPO venture capital ¯nancing of all venture-backed IPOs on
the Neuer Markt in Germany from its foundation in 1997 to its closing in 2003.
Our hand-collected database of venture-backed IPOs and their ¯nanciers consists of
information from several sources. We o®er a detailed set of descriptive statistics of
venture-backed IPOs on Germany's Neuer Markt. Hereby, we distinguish between
3 di®erent de¯nitions of \venture capital" - broad, narrow and pure de¯nitions.
Secondly, we look at the following less explored research topics:
² The venture capitalists' decision on exit timing.
Venture-backed ¯rms go public after having been ¯nanced by venture capital
for di®erent time horizons, after a di®erent number of investment rounds and
in di®erent stages of their ¯rms' lives. We identify the main determinants of
the duration of the pre-IPO venture capital ¯nancing in Germany.
² The consideration of the IPO as a \partial" exit.
Venture capitalists usually exit only partially at the IPO and commit them-
selves to hold part of their shares for several months beyond the IPO (lock-up).
There are large di®erences in the level of these post-IPO shareholdings and the
length of the committed lock-up period among venture capitalists. We inves-
tigate how the decision on the lock-up level is related to the timing of the IPO
and the features of the VC ¯nancing.
Thirdly, we demonstrate signi¯cant di®erences in the investment patterns and the
characteristics between German and non-German VC ¯rms. Lower equity holdings,
smaller average o®ering size and shorter ¯nancing periods, which characterize Ger-
man venture capitalists in our sample, might be explained by the grandstanding
phenomenon theoretically derived by Gompers (1993) and empirically analyzed by
Gompers (1996). According to the grandstanding hypothesis, younger VC ¯rms take
their portfolio ¯rms public earlier (after shorter ¯nancing periods) than established
VC ¯rms, in order to increase their reputation and be able to attract capital for
new funds. Since German VC ¯rms are typically younger and smaller than foreign
¯rms investing in Germany, Gompers' hypothesis could o®er an explanation for their
investment patterns.
Another explanation for some of the di®erences in the investment and divestment
strategies of German and non-German VC ¯rms is based on a value-added hy-
pothesis. Venture capitalists o®er a combined provision of capital and managerial
experience (see e.g. Casamatta, 2003). They monitor strategic and managerial deci-
sions, tend to take an active role in advising the ¯rm and providing it with valuable
business contacts. Most of German VC ¯rms are very young whereas the majority of
2VC ¯rms from abroad are established companies with experience. After building-up
or restructuring a portfolio company, the capabilities of young VC ¯rms with low
experience to add value through further management support are lower than that
of experienced venture capital ¯rms. Hence, inexperienced VC ¯rms may want to
exit earlier since, after a certain period, their comparative advantage to potential
new investors is not very high whereas experienced VC ¯rms may prefer to exit
later (see Tykvov¶ a, 2003 for a theoretical model). While increasing the value of the
portfolio ¯rm over a longer horizon, experienced VC ¯rms can substantially raise
its valuation. Young VC ¯rms may prefer to turn their shares into cash earlier and
invest it in other ¯rms to which they can add more value. Because of their relatively
little experience, they may prefer to invest in companies in a later stage in which
the needs for the non-monetary contribution by the venture capitalists are lower
than in younger ¯rms. Thus, the value-added hypothesis helps explain the shorter
investment durations and the later stage focus by German venture capitalists. It
may also serve as an explanation for the di®erent sectoral structure of the portfolios
of German and non-German VC ¯rms.
Both the grandstanding and the value-added hypotheses probably play a role in ex-
plaining the di®erences between German and non-German VC ¯rms. To distinguish
between them, we would have to take a closer look at the fundraising process of
German venture capital ¯rms and the role that reputation plays here. Fundraising
in Germany is, for a large part, organized di®erently and it seems likely that it does
not play such an important role as in the US, since in Germany the large fraction of
funds are not independent private funds but rather subsidiaries of insurance compa-
nies and banks and often organized as public-private partnerships (see Bascha and
Walz, 2002). Such institutional arrangements may result in an easier access to new
funds.
German venture capitalists use lock-up periods that are longer than prescribed by
the Rules and Regulations Neuer Markt (\Regelwerk Neuer Markt") more often
than foreign VC ¯rms. We argue that the reason for this is that foreign VC ¯rms
have a higher reputation at stake. Their presence helps certi¯cate the quality of
their portfolio ¯rms. German VC ¯rms are younger and smaller, and thus may
want to signal quality by locking themselves in for a longer period of time. In a
seminal paper on signaling as a means of information transfer between the insider
and the uninformed new investors, Leland and Pyle (1977) show that the insider's
willingness to retain shares can serve as a signal of the project quality. Brav and
Gompers (2003) demonstrate that in the US insiders of ¯rms that are associated
with greater potential for moral hazard lockup their shares for a longer period of
time. Hence, signaling and certi¯cation issues may o®er an additional explanation
for the di®erences between German and non-German VC ¯rms.
We employ descriptive statistics, hazard rate models and Tobit regressions to study
the venture capitalists' behavior. The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows:
3section 2 will o®er a short overview of the data, descriptive statistics on a wide set
of variables will be presented in section 3 and regression results will be reported in
section 4. Section 5 will discuss the relevance of the value-added, the grandstanding
and the certi¯cation hypotheses for our data. Finally, section 6 will conclude. When
appropriate, we compare our results to the outcomes of other empirical studies which
are based on US data.
2 Data sources
Our analysis of the venture capitalists' behavior is based on a unique hand-collected
database of venture-backed IPOs on Germany's Neuer Markt. We obtained the
data from several sources. The information on the development of the structure of
the ¯rms' equity, the duration and history of the VC ¯nancing before the IPO, the
committed lock-up period, the ¯rm characteristics (e.g. age) and the preplanned
o®ering features (o®ering size with distinction between old and new shares, avail-
able greenshoe, etc.) was collected from the listing prospectuses of the companies.
Sometimes the listing prospectus did not contain a detailed description of the de-
velopment of the ¯rm's equity structure. In those cases, the VentureXpert database
was searched through for missing data on the VC ¯nancing. From the Deutsche
BÄ orse AG, we received data concerning the IPO (e.g. date of the IPO, o®er price,
¯rst price, exhausting of the greenshoe, the classi¯cation of the branch, names of
Designated Sponsors2 and underwriters, etc.). All ¯nancial data before 1999 were
converted into Euros. We considered only \real" IPOs. Hence, we excluded ¯rms
that were listed on another exchange when going public on Germany's Neuer Markt.
In its short history, there were 327 IPOs on Germany's Neuer Markt. Based on the
indication by the Deutsche BÄ orse AG, that provided us with a database of venture-
backed IPOs, nearly 55 % of them (179 companies) were venture-backed. We refer
to the indication by the Deutsche BÄ orse AG as the broad de¯nition of VC. Using
a narrower de¯nition of VC (¯rms a±liated at a venture capital association), we
could indicate 139 (42.5 % of all IPOs) venture-backed IPOs (hereinafter denoted
by: narrow de¯nition of VC). However, when we excluded the ¯nanciers who were
engaged only in bridge ¯nancing3 from this group, 86 issuers (26.3 %) remained
(pure VC). The number of IPOs for the di®erent de¯nitions of VC, sorted by year,
is reported in table 1.
The shareholder structure (prior to and immediately after the IPO) and, hence,
the venture capitalists' fraction of equity and number of shares held were found in
the listing prospectuses (for each venture capitalist). For each ¯rm, we collected
2Each share on the Neuer Markt should have at least two Designated Sponsors. Their main task is to
provide liquidity for the trading of this security.
3When the VC ¯nancing started less than a year before the IPO and, simultaneously, more than two
years after the ¯rm's foundation, we labelled it as bridge ¯nancing.
4the data on the venture capitalists' shareholdings for all three de¯nitions of venture
capital. The VC ¯rm which held the largest share of the equity prior to the IPO
was labelled the lead venture capitalist.
The data on venture capitalists (fund and VC ¯rm size, a±liation(s), age) were
brought together from various sources: The VentureXpert database, the directories
of the German, European and US venture capital associations (BVK, EVCA, NVCA)
and Webpages of VC ¯rms on the Internet. The reputation coe±cient is based
equally on the size and the age of the VC ¯rm.
The reputation of an underwriter depends on his activities as the leading underwriter
(the number of new issues on the Neuer Markt and their volume in the previous
period) and is determined yearly. The reputation of a designated sponsor is based
equally on the number of his mandates on the Neuer Markt and on his rating by
the Deutsche BÄ orse AG in the preceding period and is set up quarterly.
In what follows, we will present our results separately for each of the three groups
mentioned above. When appropriate, we will compare our ¯ndings from the German
market to that of the US. The comparison will be based on the results by Megginson
and Weiss (1991), resp. Barry et al. (1990). These papers will hereinafter be denoted
by MW, resp. BM.
3 Descriptive statistics
We divide the ¯rms into two subgroups depending on whether or not the lead venture
capitalist is German. For both of these subgroups and for each of the three de¯nitions
of VC, table 3 presents descriptive statistics (mean, number of observations) on a
number of variables concerning the characteristics of the ¯rms (Panel A) and the
IPO (Panel B), the pre-IPO venture capital ¯nancing (Panel C) and the venture
capitalists' behavior at the IPO (Panel D). We will discuss Panels A and B in
subsection 3.1 and Panels C and D in subsection 3.2. We conduct a standard t-
test to analyze di®erences in means between the two subgroups. Especially in cases
where samples are small and the underlying distributions are not normal, it may
not be appropriate to compare means. Therefore we also use the Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney test to analyze the equality of medians. The list of all dummy variables
mentioned in the paper can be found in table 2.
3.1 The characteristics of the ¯rms and the IPO
On average, the ¯rms in our sample are 11.6 years old when they go public (12.1
for the narrow de¯nition, 11.9 for pure VC), compared to 8.6 years in the US (see
MW). Companies in which a German ¯rm is the lead venture capitalist are younger
when going public than ¯rms backed by lead VC ¯rm from abroad. The di®erence,
5however, is not signi¯cant. For the broad de¯nition of VC, 41 ¯rms (22.9 %) belong
to the internet industry, 34 (19.0%) to technology, 22 (12.3 %) to software and the
same number to biotechnology, medical technology & health care, 21 (11.7 %) to IT
services, 19 (10.6 %) to media & entertainment, 10 (5.6 %) to telecommunications,
8 (4.5 %) to industrials & industrial services and 2 (1.1 %) to ¯nancial services. In
that part of their portfolio which they take public on the Neuer Markt, lead VC ¯rms
from Germany have a lower fraction of internet and software ¯rms, compared to lead
venture capitalists from abroad, whereas the share of ¯rms from the branches media
& entertainment and IT services is higher. The di®erences in the representation of
the branches internet, software and media & entertainment are signi¯cant only for
one de¯nition of VC and then only at the 10 % signi¯cance level. The di®erence for
IT services is signi¯cant twice, at the 5 % and at the 10 % level.
The majority of venture-backed ¯rms that go public on the Neuer Markt are located
in Germany (84.9 % for the broad de¯nition of VC). Logically, for all three de¯ni-
tions of VC, the portfolio of German venture capitalists consists of a signi¯cantly
larger fraction of German ¯rms than the portfolio of foreign VC ¯rms (at the 1 %
signi¯cance level).
For the broad de¯nition, the average size of a ¯rm (nominal share capital) after
the capital increase via IPO is 9.27 Mil. Euros. The average book value before the
IPO is 6.12 Mil. Euros and the average market value at the IPO reaches 278.3 Mil.
Euros. Firms backed by a lead VC ¯rm from Germany are smaller. Particularly
the di®erence in the market values is highly signi¯cant (for the broad and narrow
de¯nitions). Book-to-market ratios are not signi¯cantly di®erent.
For broad and narrow de¯nitions of VC, the o®ering size of ¯rms backed by a lead VC
¯rm from Germany is signi¯cantly smaller, both in shares and in Euros. The average
number of shares o®ered at the IPO is 2.59 Mil.; the average market value of the
o®ering reaches 53.4 Mil. Euros (for the broad de¯nition of VC; without greenshoe).
In ¯rms backed by lead venture capitalists from Germany, the fraction of old shares
on the total o®ering is higher, although not signi¯cantly. For all venture-backed
¯rms it reaches 21.0 %.
The available greenshoe in shares and in Euros, the relative available greenshoe (in %
of the total o®ering) and the used greenshoe in shares and in Euros are signi¯cantly
higher for ¯rms backed by a non-German VC ¯rm. The o®er price and the ¯rst price
do not di®er signi¯cantly. For all three de¯nitions of VC, the average underpricing4
is higher for ¯rms backed by lead venture capitalists from Germany. However, the
di®erence is not signi¯cant in either case.
4Underpricing is de¯ned as: (¯rst price - o®er price)/o®er price ¤ 100 %.
63.2 The pre-IPO venture capital ¯nancing and the behavior of VC ¯rms
during the IPO
The descriptive statistics on the variables discussed in this subsection can be found
in Panels C and D of table 3. The pre-IPO venture capital ¯nancing lasts 19.7
months on average (18.2 for the narrow de¯nition, 28.9 for pure VC). For the broad
and the narrow de¯nitions of VC, the German venture capitalists take their portfolio
¯rms public signi¯cantly earlier than their non-German counterparts.
One important feature of venture capital ¯nancing is staging. The ¯rms do not
receive the entire investment sum at the beginning, but rather in stages correspond-
ing to signi¯cant developments in the life of the company (e.g. the development of
a prototype, the ¯rst production, etc.). The capital invested at each point should
be su±cient to bring the company to the next stage of its development. The ven-
ture capitalist's option to stop the ¯nancing helps mitigate agency costs. In our
sample, lead venture capitalists from abroad carry through signi¯cantly more in-
vestment rounds on average than venture capitalists from Germany (for the broad
and the narrow de¯nition of VC), providing their portfolio ¯rms more often with
fresh capital, before they take their portfolio ¯rms public.
Syndication with other venture capitalists improves the portfolio diversi¯cation of a
VC ¯rm which can, with a limited amount of resources, participate in more projects.
Additionally, Brander, Amit, and Antweiler (2002) con¯rm that syndicated projects
o®er higher returns than projects that are ¯nanced by only a single venture capitalist.
Between 51.1 - 56.2 % (depending on the VC de¯nition) of the ¯rms in our sample
are ¯nanced via a syndicate of several VC funds. Table 4 shows the distribution of
the number of VC funds per ¯rm. The average number of VC funds in a venture-
backed ¯rm at the IPO is 2.7 for the broad de¯nition (2.3 for the narrow de¯nition,
2.4 for pure VC) compared to 3.0 in the BM sample. When we consider only funds
of di®erent VC companies as a syndicated investment, only between 40.5 - 51.7 %
(depending on the VC de¯nition) of investments are syndicated. The results di®er
signi¯cantly between German and non-German VC ¯rms. Lead venture capitalists
from Germany syndicate less. For foreign VC ¯rms, the syndication at the funds'
level reaches 72.0 % and the average number of VC funds in a company is 3.8
whereas in ¯rms where a German venture capitalist is the lead investor, only 44.7 %
of investments are syndicated and the average number of venture capital funds is 1.9
(broad de¯nition). The di®erence between foreign and domestic lead investors for
both variables, the number of VC funds and the number of VC ¯rms per portfolio
company, is signi¯cant for all de¯nitions of VC. For broad and narrow de¯nitions,
the non-German VC ¯rms start their investments in signi¯cantly earlier ¯rm stages
than German venture capitalists.
Typically, the venture capitalists take concentrated equity positions. In our sample,
the broad group of VC ¯rms owns 32.0 % (the narrow de¯nition: 26.0 %, pure VC:
29.6 %) of the pre-IPO equity of the issuer on average. This is slightly less than
7in the US where venture capitalists hold 36.6 % (MW), resp. 34.3 % (BM). In our
sample, large di®erences between non-German and German venture capitalists exist
(for the broad and the narrow de¯nition of VC). The average pre-IPO share of a
group of venture capitalists under a lead VC ¯rm from abroad amounts to 38.3 %,
32.6 %, resp. 32.8 % for broad, narrow, resp. pure VC and, hence, is similar to the
results presented by BM and MW; whereas if a lead venture capitalist is a German
¯rm, the venture capitalists' share on the equity is signi¯cantly lower. The fraction
of ¯rms in which the group of venture capitalists' holds large equity positions (50%
of equity and more) prior to the IPO is signi¯cantly larger in the subsample of lead
VC ¯rms from abroad. For the broad de¯nition of VC, this fraction amounts to 29.3
% for foreign and 10.7 % for German venture capitalists. MW report 28 % and BM
24.4 % for the US (see table 5). If we consider the narrow, resp. pure de¯nition,
this share further reduces to 17.5 %, resp. 12.8 % for foreign VC ¯rms and to 6.6
%, resp. 10.8 % for lead venture capitalists from Germany.
We can document signi¯cant di®erences in the total pre-IPO venture capitalists'
holdings between the two subgroups. However, the respective shares of the single
lead venture capitalists are not signi¯cantly di®erent. The explanation of this phe-
nomenon is that lead venture capitalists from Germany syndicate less and, hence,
the holdings of a group of venture capitalists are lower, in spite of the fact that there
are no signi¯cant di®erences in the shareholdings between single lead VC ¯rms in
both groups.
The venture capitalists maintain their investment beyond the IPO. After the IPO
(and the capital increase), they retain 18.6 % (the narrow de¯nition: 14.4 %, the
pure VC: 16.2 %) of shares and, on average, they even increase their shareholdings
during the IPO. This result, however, is in°uenced particularly by one ¯rm where
the venture capitalists massively raise their shareholdings (more than 150 times!). In
10 out of 179 ¯rms (broad de¯nition), the venture capitalists' shareholdings increase
during the IPO (see table 6). The increase in shareholdings is typically due to the
conversion of convertible securities at the IPO. If we consider only shares owned
by the venture capitalists prior to the IPO, they retain 76.2 % of them beyond
the IPO on average. When the lead VC ¯rm is German, the group of venture
capitalists sells a larger fraction of the pre-IPO holdings at the IPO on average.
The di®erence is signi¯cant only for the broad de¯nition. The behavior of the VC
¯rms in the US, documented in MW, is very di®erent: Here, the venture capitalists
sell only about 8 % of their pre-IPO holdings at the IPO. In the majority of ¯rms
in the US (56.7 %), the venture capitalists do not sell any shares at all during the
IPO whereas in Germany this is true in only less than 30 % of the cases (without
signi¯cant di®erences between ¯rms backed by a German vs. non-German lead
venture capitalist).
If we consider only ¯rms in which venture capitalists sell some or all of their old
shares at the IPO, we can detect signi¯cant di®erences in the fraction sold by the
8VC ¯rms between companies where a German VC ¯rm is the lead venture capitalist
and ¯rms in which a foreign VC ¯rm holds the largest share. When backed by a
lead VC ¯rm from Germany, a signi¯cantly higher fraction of old shareholdings is
sold by the VC ¯rms at the IPO.
The lock-up period prescribed by the Rules and Regulations Neuer Markt, in which
old investors are not allowed to sell their old shares, lasts six months. However, in
more than 40 % of venture-backed ¯rms, some or all old investors commit themselves
not to sell their shares for a period longer than six months. There are signi¯cant
di®erences between both subgroups. German VC ¯rms employ a longer lock-up
period in every second ¯rm, whereas lead venture capitalists from abroad do this in
only every third to fourth ¯rm.
We divide the history of Germany's Neuer Markt into three periods. The starting
phase with a low issuing activity, from the launching of this market segment in
March 1997 to the end of February 1999, is classi¯ed as a cold issue period. The
time horizon between March 1, 1999 and November 30, 2000, in which the number
of ¯rms going public and prices exploded, is the only hot issue period. Afterwards
the prices and issuing activities crashed down and have never recovered. Thus, the
period since December 1, 2000 is labelled a cold issue period. The IPOs in our
sample are heavily concentrated in the hot issue phase. More than 76 % of the ¯rms
in our sample went public in this phase. There are no signi¯cant di®erences in the
timing of the IPO in hot and cold issue periods between German and non-German
venture capitalists.
Large economically and statistically signi¯cant di®erences between the investment
patterns of German and foreign VC ¯rms exist. However, among pure venture capi-
talists, the similarities between both subgroups increase substantially. Here, the only
signi¯cant di®erences are in the preference for domestic ¯rms, the greenshoe level,
the post-IPO share of venture capitalists as a group, the length of the committed
lock-up period, the syndication and the fraction of software ¯rms in the portfolio.
We can detect signi¯cant di®erences not only in the behavior but also in the features
of the German and non-German VC ¯rms. The former are typically younger and
smaller. We compute a reputation coe±cient based on the age and size of the VC
companies. The summary results are shown in table 7. The reputation scale ranges
from 1 to 5, where 1 is the best and 5 the worst reputation. The age and the size
are both given an equal weight of 50 %. German VC ¯rms have a signi¯cantly
higher reputation coe±cient (=lower reputation) than foreign venture capitalists. A
large part of investments from foreign VC ¯rms is concentrated in the hands of 3i
Group plc and its subsidiaries. They are by far the most frequent ¯nancier in our
sample. They are the lead VC ¯rm in 11.2 % (18.0 %, 23.8 %) of the venture-backed
companies listed on Germany's Neuer Markt. Together, as a lead VC investor or
as a part of the ¯nancing consortium, 3i holds shares of 32 ¯rms in our sample of
venture-backed ¯rms (broad de¯nition).
94 Regression Results
4.1 Timing of the IPO
We next explore the determinants of the duration of the pre-IPO venture capital
¯nancing in a multivariate regression approach. For each of the three de¯nitions
of VC, we conduct a hazard rate analysis to model the duration between the ¯rst
venture capitalist's equity holdings and the IPO, employing two commonly used
parametric models (Weibull and exponential) and one semi-parametric model (Cox
proportional hazard model). The advantage of the semiparametric model is that it
involves minimal distributional assumptions (Cox, 1972). The description of these
models is presented in Appendix. All three models deliver very similar results. It is
a good indicator of the robustness of these estimations.
Di®erences in the consulting intensity of projects as well as in the venture capital-
ists' experience and their impact on the duration of the pre-IPO venture capital
¯nancing have been modelled theoretically by Tykvov¶ a (2003). One of the empirical
implications of this model is that more experienced venture capitalists ¯nance their
portfolio ¯rms longer before they bring them public than less experienced VC ¯rms.
In the estimations here, we use the German VC dummy and, alternatively, the rep-
utation coe±cient as proxies for experience. Due to di®erences in the demands for
venture capitalists' consulting services, we expect di®ering lengths of the pre-IPO
venture capital ¯nancing periods among industries. Therefore, dummy variables for
industries are included in the regressions.
Firstly, we estimate the models with a large matrix of dependent variables (\full"
models). This matrix consists of a quality variable (market-to-book ratio) and a set
of dummy variables for industries, domestic dummy, German VC dummy and start-
up dummy (results not reported here). With the help of the Akaike information
criterion we then determine the optimal size of the matrix of explanatory variables.
For every single de¯nition of venture capital, the appropriate variables resulting
from the use of the Akaike information criterion are the same in all three model
speci¯cations (Weibull, exponential and Cox). For the broad de¯nition of VC, the
following dummy variables are included: German VC, start-up and three of the
branches dummy variables. For the narrow de¯nition, the dependent variables are
nearly the same as for the broad de¯nition, with the exception of one of the branches
dummy variables that is removed. For pure VC, only two variables (branches dummy
variables) remain.
We report regression outcomes in table 8. Our results provide further evidence for
the di®erent behavior of German venture capitalists. The German VC dummy be-
longs to the regression (except for pure VC) and its coe±cient is always positive at
a high signi¯cance level. German VC ¯rms ¯nance their portfolio ¯rms for shorter
periods before they take them public. If we, in spite of the Akaike criterion, included
10this variable to the estimations for pure VC, its coe±cient would have the same sign
as in the regressions for broad and narrow de¯nitions but would not be signi¯cant.
Firms from the branches internet and media & entertainment are ¯nanced for sig-
ni¯cantly shorter periods. For broad and narrow de¯nitions of venture capital, the
investment in a start-up company leads to longer ¯nancing periods. Additionally,
the telecommunications ¯rms are taken public earlier (broad de¯nition).
Simple OLS regressions lead to similar results as the hazard rate models discussed
above. For all three de¯nitions of venture capital, the variables included (here, as
well, Akaike criterion is used) and their coe±cients' signs are exactly the same as in
the hazard rate models and are not reported here.
If we employ the reputation coe±cient instead of the German VC dummy in the
hazard rate models, we obtain similar results. We proceed as before, letting all other
variables in the \full" models stay the same. For each de¯nition of VC and each ap-
proach, we use the Akaike criterion to determine the appropriate size of the matrix of
dependent variables. All dependent variables (with the exception of the German VC
dummy that we have removed) that are in the reduced models described above, stay
here as well. Their coe±cients have the same signs and very similar magnitudes (not
reported here). Instead of the removed German VC dummy, the domestic dummy
is included for the broad de¯nition. Its coe±cient is positive, as expected, but not
signi¯cant. For the narrow de¯nition, the inclusion of two additional variables is
suggested: the domestic dummy and the reputation coe±cient. Their coe±cients
are both highly signi¯cant with expected signs: German ¯rms are taken public ear-
lier. Firms backed by a lead VC ¯rm with a higher reputation are ¯nanced longer.
For pure VC, exactly the same variables as above are included in the reduced model
when the reputation coe±cient, instead of the German VC dummy, is considered in
the \full" model.
4.2 Extent of the venture capitalists' exit
The VC ¯rms maintain their investment beyond the IPO. In this section, we model
the extent of the venture capitalists' exit at the IPO and their post-IPO sharehold-
ings on the ¯rm level. Firstly, we look at the selling activities of the group of venture
capitalists at the IPO. Secondly, we examine the determinants of the extent of the
post-IPO venture capitalists' holdings.
In the ¯rst part, in which the selling activities of the venture capitalists during
the IPO are modelled, the pre-IPO holdings of the group of venture capitalists
are taken as benchmark. The dependent variable is the fraction of these holdings
retained beyond the IPO. It lies between 0 (when all venture capitalists sell their
complete shareholdings at the IPO and, thus, the fraction of old shares retained
is 0) and 100 % (when none of the venture capitalists sells any shares). We use
Tobit regressions to explore the determinants of the fraction of shares retained.
11Particularly, we are interested in the impact of the market, ¯rm, IPO and venture
capitalists' characteristics and the role of the reputation of Designated Sponsors and
leading underwriters. For each de¯nition of VC, we run 10 regressions with di®erent
dependent variables.
If we suppose that venture capitalists prefer investing in young companies to which
they can add a large value (instead of maintaining their investments in more mature
companies that are already listed), we conclude that the venture capitalists' partic-
ipation beyond the IPO is costly and that they prefer to exit as soon as possible.
In this case, the reasons why venture capitalists do not sell all their shares at the
IPO are the asymmetric information and uncertainty. The potential new investors
expect that venture capitalists as insiders retain a fraction of their shares in order
to signal the quality of the ¯rm (see e.g. Allen and Faulhaber, 1989 and Tykvov¶ a,
2003). According to this hypothesis, factors that reduce uncertainty and diminish
the information asymmetry and / or increase the optimism of the potential new
investors should decrease the fraction retained by the venture capitalists. Thus, the
higher the opacity of the ¯rm and the greater the uncertainty, the larger the fraction
retained.
For this reason, we assume that a hot issue market may induce larger selling activities
due to the optimism of potential investors. The uncertainty, for which the width of
the bookbuilding range, the market value and the age of the ¯rm are used as proxies
(a wider bookbuilding range, smaller or younger ¯rm imply a larger uncertainty),
should have a positive impact on the fraction of shares retained. A high reputation
of venture capitalists, Designated Sponsors and underwriters may certify the ¯rm
quality and thus diminish the uncertainty (see e.g. Booth and Smith, 1986 or
Megginson and Weiss, 1991). The syndication of more venture capitalists and longer
pre-IPO ¯nancing periods should reduce uncertainty as well. Therefore, the necessity
to signal the ¯rm quality should be reduced and, thus, the impact on the fraction
of shares retained by the venture capitalists negative.
Up to now, we assumed that post-IPO shareholdings incur cost for the venture
capitalists. However, if the venture capitalists expect the revenues on the Neuer
Markt to be su±ciently high, they may prefer to pro¯t from rising prices and not
to sell their shares.
In our data, we can ¯nd con¯rmation for both hypotheses. When the venture capital-
ists expect rising share prices (in hot issue markets) and a high liquidity (Designated
Sponsors with a high reputation), they retain signi¯cantly larger fractions of shares.
In younger ¯rms and in ¯rms for which the reputation of the lead underwriter(s)
is low, the fraction sold by the venture capitalists at the IPO is smaller. Table 9
provides the results of Tobit regressions for the determinants of the fraction of old
shares retained by the group of venture capitalists beyond the IPO. Taking into
account that the observations are not independent, the robust variance is estimated
using the Huber-White-sandwich estimator employing two di®erent approaches: (i)
12allowing any structure of not independent observations and (ii) allowing not inde-
pendent observations only within predetermined clusters, based on market situation
(hot vs. cold market) and industry.
In the hot issue phase, the venture capitalists retain a signi¯cantly larger fraction
of their old shareholdings beyond the IPO (highly signi¯cant for broad and pure
de¯nitions, for the narrow de¯nition only weak evidence), probably in order to
pro¯t from the expected increase in share prices. The width of the bookbuilding
range has no e®ect. A higher ¯rm age at the IPO reduces information asymmetry
and uncertainty. Thus, the venture capitalists sell a larger fraction of their shares.
The good reputation of Designated Sponsors increases the fraction retained. This
¯nding might be explained by the venture capitalists' expectations that high-quality
Designated Sponsors guarantee su±cient liquidity. Hence, they o®er an opportunity
for the venture capitalists to participate on the expected increase in share prices
on the one hand as well as on the other hand make an unproblematic sale of their
shares possible whenever the venture capitalists may need cash in the future. We also
¯nd evidence that high-quality underwriters certi¯cate the companies and allow the
venture capitalists to sell a signi¯cantly larger fraction already at the IPO. When the
lead VC ¯rm is from Germany, the group of venture capitalists retains a signi¯cantly
lower fraction of its old shares beyond the IPO compared to ¯rms in which the lead
venture capitalist is from abroad (for the broad de¯nition of VC). The longer the
duration of the committed lock-up period, the larger the extent of the lock-up. The
market value has a signi¯cant positive impact on the fraction retained (for narrow
and pure de¯nitions).
The results from the second group of regressions (dependent variable: fraction of
¯rm held by the venture capitalists' after the IPO) show in the same direction.
Here, as well, we use Tobit model and conduct 10 regressions for each de¯nition
of VC. The robust variance is estimated using the same estimators as in the ¯rst
part. The results are depicted in table 10. The venture capitalists take larger
equity positions during the hot issue phase and in larger ¯rms. For the broad
de¯nition, the impact of the length of the committed lock-up period on the post-
IPO shareholdings is signi¯cantly positive. The ¯rm age has a negative impact. For
broad and narrow de¯nitions, a higher reputation of Designated Sponsors increases
the post-IPO shareholdings of venture capitalists. When the lead VC ¯rm is from
Germany, the group of venture capitalists takes a less concentrated equity position
compared to ¯rms in which the lead venture capitalist is from abroad. The pre-IPO
shareholdings have a signi¯cant impact on the post-IPO shareholdings. Syndication
sometimes has a signi¯cant positive impact on the fraction held by the venture
capitalists after the IPO. The reputation of venture capitalists is signi¯cant in two
cases at the 10 % level for the broad de¯nition. In agreement with the certi¯cation
hypothesis, a higher reputation leads to lower shareholdings in these two cases.
135 Grandstanding, value-added and certi¯cation hypotheses
Table 11 summarizes the main empirical ¯ndings of this paper about the di®erences
in the behavior between German and foreign VC ¯rms and indicates the relevance
of the grandstanding, value-added and certi¯cation hypotheses for their explana-
tion. Gompers (1996) shows in an empirical investigation of the US market several
di®erences in the behavior of young and old VC ¯rms. He argues that the reason
for these di®erences are the needs of young venture capital ¯rms to establish their
reputation in order to be able to attract capital for new funds in the near future. He
calls their behavior \grandstanding". We try to transmit his results on the German
VC market. Since German VC ¯rms are typically younger and smaller than foreign
VC ¯rms investing in Germany, this grandstanding hypothesis could o®er an expla-
nation for their investment patterns. In our results, we can ¯nd several parallels to
Gompers' results. He shows that young venture capital ¯rms take their portfolio
¯rms public earlier (after shorter ¯nancing periods) than established VC ¯rms. This
corresponds to our ¯nding that German venture capitalists' have shorter pre-IPO
¯nancing periods than their foreign counterparts. This fact also explains the lower
syndication by German VC ¯rms because there is a positive correlation between the
syndication level and the duration of the pre-IPO venture capital ¯nancing. Syndi-
cation typically increases over time as new investors join the ¯nancing consortium.
We can ¯nd further similarities between his and our results: The average o®ering
size is smaller for young (in our case: German) VC ¯rms. The average fraction of
equity held by the group of venture capitalists prior to the IPO is lower for young
(in our case: German) VC ¯rms.
Contrary to Gompers, who ¯nds that ¯rms backed by a young VC ¯rm are them-
selves younger at the IPO, the average age of a venture-backed company at the IPO
in Germany is not signi¯cantly di®erent between the two groups of VC ¯rms (for
any of the three de¯nitions of VC). If we employ the reputation coe±cient, instead
of the German VC dummy, and divide the sample into two subsamples (high vs.
low reputation), there is still no signi¯cant di®erence between both the means and
medians of the ¯rm age. This ¯nding can be explained by the fact that German VC
¯rms invest in later stages. Hence, in spite of a shorter ¯nancing horizon, the age of
the ¯rms at the IPO is not lower for ¯rms backed by a German VC ¯rm. Gompers
further ¯nds di®erences in the underpricing. In his sample, the average underpricing
is higher for ¯rms backed by a young VC ¯rm whereas in our sample there are no
signi¯cant di®erences.
In Germany, the large fraction of domestic funds are not independent private funds
as in the US, but subsidiaries of insurance companies and banks. They are often
organized as public-private partnerships (see Bascha and Walz, 2002). Therefore,
the fundraising process in Germany is, for the most part, structured di®erently than
in the US. Hence, we o®er an additional explanation, which we call value-added
hypothesis, for the di®ering investment patterns of German VC ¯rms.
14Venture capitalists participate in strategic decisions, o®er advice and provide their
portfolio ¯rms with valuable business contacts. This non-monetary contribution
increases the ¯rm's value. In early stages, the venture capitalist's managerial in-
volvement often plays a decisive role in the survival of a young ¯rm. As the ¯rm
grows older, the non-monetary contribution is less and less important. At a certain
point of time, the comparative advantage of VC ¯rms to potential new investors is
not very high any more. A venture capitalists' further managerial contribution adds
little value to the ¯rm. VC ¯rms prefer to turn their shares into cash at this time
and invest it in other ¯rms to which they could add more value. This explains the
age similarities of ¯rms in both groups. The relatively little experience of German
VC ¯rms in ¯nancing and advising ¯rms may be the reason for their preference to
invest in more mature companies in which the needs for their non-monetary contri-
bution are lower than in younger ¯rms. Both the grandstanding and the value-added
hypotheses probably play a role in explaining the di®erences in the behavior of Ger-
man and non-German VC ¯rms. Future research should examine the fundraising
process in Germany and its di®erences to that of the US in detail.
As prescribed by the Rules and Regulations Neuer Markt, old investors are not
allowed to sell their shares during the period of 6 months beyond the IPO. They often
commit themselves to hold their shares for periods longer than this requirement.
Old shareholders tend do this more often when the lead VC ¯rm is German. The
inside investors in companies backed by German venture capitalists probably try
to signal the quality of their ¯rms by locking themselves in for longer periods than
are required. In ¯rms backed by a lead VC ¯rm from abroad, the presence of a
foreign venture capitalist with a large reputation at stake serves as a certi¯cation of
the ¯rm's quality. High-quality underwriters play as well a certi¯cation role for the
companies they bring public. They allow the venture capitalists to sell a signi¯cantly
larger fraction already at the IPO.
6 Conclusion
After a certain period of time, venture capitalists have to exit their investments.
The purpose of this paper is to examine some important aspects of the investment
and particularly divestment process of venture capitalists in Germany. Hereby, we
concentrate on the IPO which is considered in the literature to be the most pro¯table
exit channel. At the same time, it is the only divestment channel for which publicly
available data in Germany exist. Since di®erent people understand di®erent things
under the term venture capital, we distinguish between three di®erent de¯nitions of
it and carry out our analysis separately for all of them. We examine all venture-
backed IPOs on Germany's Neuer Markt from its launching in March 1997 to its
closing in 2003.
15Our results show that large di®erences in the behavior of VC investors exist (par-
ticularly for the broad and narrow de¯nitions of VC). We look at the di®erences
between German and non-German VC ¯rms in detail. German venture capitalists
in our sample tend to invest more in IT services and media & entertainment and
less in ¯rms from the branches internet and software. They strongly prefer German
¯rms to companies from abroad. They back signi¯cantly smaller o®erings with a
lower capital increase at the IPO. Both the available and the used greenshoe are
smaller. The share of the available greenshoe on the total o®ering volume is sig-
ni¯cantly lower as well. The pre-IPO and post-IPO shareholdings of the group of
venture capitalists are lower and the selling intensity is higher when a German ¯rm
is the lead venture capitalist. Non-German VC ¯rms employ signi¯cantly more in-
vestment rounds before they take their portfolio ¯rms public, they invest in ¯rms
in earlier stages and ¯nance them longer than German venture capitalists. They
also syndicate more. German venture capitalists commit themselves to hold their
shares after the IPO for longer periods than venture capital ¯rms from abroad. The
grandstanding, the value-added and the certi¯cation / signaling hypotheses deliver
hints for the explanation of some of these di®erences in the investment patterns
between German and non-German VC ¯rms.
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17Appendix: Hazard Models
The duration data are typically analyzed via hazard models. We use three di®erent
hazard models to estimate the duration of the pre-IPO venture capital investment:
two parametric models (exponential, Weibull) and a semi-parametric model (Cox).
The di®erences between them are in the underlying survival distributions.
The hazard rate h(t) is the conditional probability that a unit \exits" exactly at t,
given it lasts until t. Precisely, h(t) = lim
h!0
Prob(t · T < t + hjT ¸ t)=h. The
survivor function S(t) is the probability that the duration will equal or exceed the
value t.
1. The exponential hazard model
The survivor function is S(t) = exp(¡¸t);¸ > 0. The hazard rate equals
h(t) = ¸ = exp(¯0X). The hazard rate does not vary over time.
2. The Weibull hazard model
Here, the hazard rate changes over time. It is monotonically increasing or
decreasing depending on the parameter p (that is also estimated). The hazard
rate is h(t) = ¸p(¸t)p¡1 where ¸ = exp(¯0X).
3. The Cox proportional hazard model (see Cox, 1972)
The formal model is h(t) = h0(t)exp(¯0X). Every single contribution to like-
lihood is the hazard rate for the individual k who \exits" at t divided by the
sum of the hazard rates for the individuals who exit at t and later:
exp(¯0Xk) P
l2Rj
exp(¯0Xl).
The baseline hazard function is eliminated. Thus, this model does not impose
any structure on the baseline hazard h0(t). The partial likelihood is then the
product of the individual contributions
L(¯) =
n Y
j=1
exp(¯0Xj)
P
l2Rj
exp(¯0Xl)
:
Since there are tied events (spells of the same length) in our data set, we
modify the numerator of the partial likelihood using Breslow approximation
(see Breslow, 1974) to account for the multiple possible orderings. Let dj
denote the multiplicity of exits at tj and Dj the set of individuals that exit at
tj. Let sj be the sum of the vectors Xl over the individuals who fail at tj. The
Breslow approximation is then
LBreslow(¯) =
n Y
j=1
exp(¯0sj)
[
P
l2Rj
exp(¯0Xl)]dj
We use other approximations (the Efron and the exact methods) that deliver
very similar results (not reported here).
18Table 1: Number of IPOs on Germany's Neuer Markt and their VC backing
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Total
Broad de¯nition of VC 7 23 66 78 4 1 179
Narrow de¯nition of VC 7 17 52 59 4 0 139
Pure VC 6 8 30 39 3 0 86
All IPOs 11 41 130 133 11 1 327
BROAD DEFINITION OF VC - indication of the Deutsche BÄ orse AG, NARROW DEFINITION OF VC -
¯rms a±liated at a VC association, PURE VC - narrow de¯nition minus bridge ¯nancing.
Table 2: De¯nitions of the dummy variables
INTERNET One, if the ¯rm belongs to internet industry, zero otherwise
IT SERVICES One, if the ¯rm belongs to IT services, zero otherwise
MEDIA & ENTERTAINMENT One, if the ¯rm belongs to media & entertainment industry,
zero otherwise
SOFTWARE One, if the ¯rm belongs to software industry, zero otherwise
TELECOMMUNICATIONS One, if the ¯rm belongs to telecommunications industry,
zero otherwise
DOMESTIC One, if the ¯rm is located in Germany, zero otherwise
SYNDICATION One, if more than one VC funds hold ¯rm's shares, zero
otherwise
LOCK > 6 One, if the committed lock-up period exceeds 6 months,
zero otherwise
HOT ISSUE One, if the ¯rm went public during the hot issue perioda,
zero otherwise
GERMAN VC One, if the lead venture capital ¯rm is located in Germany,
zero otherwise
START-UP One, if the venture capital ¯rm begins to ¯nance the com-
pany in the start-up phase, zero otherwise
aThe hot issue period was the time horizon between March 1, 1999 and November 30, 2000.
19Table 3: Lead VC ¯rms from Germany vs. abroad - descriptive statistics
This table provides descriptive statistics for variables associated with the characteristics of the ¯rm (PANEL A)
and the IPO (PANEL B), the pre-IPO venture capital ¯nancing (PANEL C) and the venture capitalists' behavior
at the IPO (PANEL D). The ¯rms are divided into two subgroups depending on whether or not the lead VC ¯rm
is German. Further, we use three di®erent de¯nitions of VC: broad, narrow and pure. For each variable, the table
presents six di®erent values (three de¯nitions, for each de¯nition two subsamples) for the number of observations and
the mean. Further, we conduct a standard two-sided t-test (allowing for unequal variances) to test for di®erences
in means between the subgroups of lead VC ¯rms from Germany and abroad. Additionally, we use the Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney test to test for the equality of medians. One, two and three asterisks indicate signi¯cance at the 10
%, 5 % and 1 % level or better.
p-value p-value
VARIABLE Obs. Mean
(t-test) (Wilcoxon)
PANEL A: Characteristics of the portfolio ¯rms
AGE, IPO Non-German, Broad 75 12.27
German, Broad 103 11.12
0.5105 0.5607
(Years)
Non-German, Narrow 63 12.43
German, Narrow 76 11.75
0.7426 0.4190
Non-German, Pure 47 12.20
German, Pure 37 11.51
0.7657 0.8113
INTERNET Non-German, Broad 75 0.29
German, Broad 103 0.18
0.0981* 0.0894*
Non-German, Narrow 63 0.27
German, Narrow 76 0.17
0.1678 0.1602
Non-German, Pure 47 0.17
German, Pure 37 0.11
0.4151 0.4221
IT SERVICES Non-German, Broad 75 0.07
German, Broad 103 0.16
0.0562* 0.0710*
Non-German, Narrow 63 0.05
German, Narrow 76 0.16
0.0294** 0.0377**
Non-German, Pure 47 0.06
German, Pure 37 0.16
0.1726 0.1505
MEDIA & Non-German, Broad 75 0.05
German, Broad 103 0.14
0.0554* 0.0719*
ENTERTAINMENT
Non-German, Narrow 63 0.06
German, Narrow 76 0.13
0.1741 0.1858
Non-German, Pure 47 0.02
German, Pure 37 0.05
0.4519 0.4244
DOMESTIC Non-German, Broad 75 0.67
German, Broad 103 0.98
0.0000*** 0.0000***
Non-German, Narrow 63 0.70
German, Narrow 76 0.96
0.0001*** 0.0000***
Non-German, Pure 47 0.66
German, Pure 37 0.95
0.0006*** 0.0016***
20Table 3 - continued
p-value p-value
VARIABLE Obs. Mean
(t-test) (Wilcoxon)
BOOK VALUE, IPO Non-German, Broad 75 7.1
German, Broad 103 5.4
0.2350 0.2909
(Euro Mil.)
Non-German, Narrow 63 6.5
German, Narrow 76 4.5
0.0991* 0.0866*
Non-German, Pure 47 5.9
German, Pure 37 6.0
0.9555 0.9533
MARKET VALUE, IPO Non-German, Broad 75 331.4
German, Broad 103 239.7
0.0705* 0.0038***
(Euro Mil.)
Non-German, Narrow 63 311.0
German, Narrow 76 196.3
0.0072*** 0.0011***
Non-German, Pure 47 249.0
German, Pure 37 233.2
0.7097 0.2697
BOOKTOMARKET, IPO Non-German, Broad 75 26.1
German, Broad 103 26.5
0.9194 0.4411
(¤10¡3)
Non-German, Narrow 63 26.7
German, Narrow 76 25.9
0.8685 0.6244
Non-German, Pure 47 27.9
German, Pure 37 31.3
0.6527 0.3995
Post-IPO SHARE CAP. Non-German, Broad 75 10.55
German, Broad 103 8.24
0.2726 0.8205
(Euro Mil.)
Non-German, Narrow 63 11.15
German, Narrow 76 6.96
0.0737* 0.2533
Non-German, Pure 47 7.71
German, Pure 37 8.21
0.7594 0.6719
21Table 3 - continued
p-value p-value
VARIABLE Obs. Mean
(t-test) (Wilcoxon)
PANEL B: IPO characteristics
OFFERING SIZE Non-German, Broad 75 3.25
German, Broad 103 2.09
0.0076*** 0.0002***
(Shares Mil.)
Non-German, Narrow 63 3.21
German, Narrow 76 1.94
0.0055*** 0.0005***
Non-German, Pure 47 2.95
German, Pure 37 2.35
0.1757 0.1117
OFFERING SIZE Non-German, Broad 75 65.93
German, Broad 103 44.11
0.0059*** 0.0002***
(Euro Mil.)
Non-German, Narrow 63 63.61
German, Narrow 76 40.83
0.0025*** 0.0002***
Non-German, Pure 47 53.87
German, Pure 37 52.25
0.8446 0.2897
OLD SHARES SOLD Non-German, Broad 75 325743
German, Broad 101 493950
0.5992 0.0191**
Non-German, Narrow 62 279620
German, Narrow 75 408257
0.7319 0.0044***
Non-German, Pure 46 607128
German, Pure 37 475710
0.4933 0.0865*
OLD SHARES SOLD Non-German, Broad 75 19.22
German, Broad 101 22.54
0.6190 0.5847
(in % of total o®ering)
Non-German, Narrow 62 19.47
German, Narrow 75 21.95
0.7583 0.3808
Non-German, Pure 46 21.08
German, Pure 37 25.43
0.6120 0.7728
AVAIL. GREENSHOE Non-German, Broad 75 455670
German, Broad 103 223606
0.0004*** 0.0000***
(Shares)
Non-German, Narrow 63 447725
German, Narrow 76 199799
0.0004*** 0.0000***
Non-German, Pure 47 411047
German, Pure 37 271475
0.0349** 0.0140**
AVAIL. GREENSHOE Non-German, Broad 75 9.07
German, Broad 103 4.69
0.0002*** 0.0000***
(Euro Mil.)
Non-German, Narrow 63 8.63
German, Narrow 76 4.23
0.0001*** 0.0000***
Non-German, Pure 47 7.46
German, Pure 37 6.05
0.2053 0.0869*
22Table 3 - continued
p-value p-value
VARIABLE Obs. Mean
(t-test) (Wilcoxon)
AVAIL. GREENSHOE Non-German, Broad 75 13.76
German, Broad 103 9.85
0.0000*** 0.0000***
(in % of total o®ering)
Non-German, Narrow 63 13.76
German, Narrow 76 9.63
0.0000*** 0.0001***
Non-German, Pure 47 14.17
German, Pure 37 11.00
0.0051*** 0.0558*
USED GREENSHOE Non-German, Broad 75 380666
German, Broad 101 191465
0.0032*** 0.0001***
(Shares)
Non-German, Narrow 62 400251
German, Narrow 75 151763
0.0006*** 0.0000***
Non-German, Pure 46 348828
German, Pure 37 215663
0.0629* 0.0217**
USED GREENSHOE Non-German, Broad 75 7.92
German, Broad 101 4.15
0.0011*** 0.0001***
(Euro Mil.)
Non-German, Narrow 62 8.00
German, Narrow 75 3.43
0.0002*** 0.0000***
Non-German, Pure 46 6.66
German, Pure 37 5.20
0.2407 0.1215
OFFER PRICE Non-German, Broad 75 24.10
German, Broad 103 24.35
0.8927 0.8655
(Euro)
Non-German, Narrow 63 24.26
German, Narrow 76 24.06
0.9253 0.8622
Non-German, Pure 47 22.51
German, Pure 37 24.63
0.4739 0.5550
FIRST PRICE Non-German, Broad 75 37.95
German, Broad 103 40.10
0.6593 0.6757
(Euro)
Non-German, Narrow 63 38.57
German, Narrow 76 38.17
0.9439 0.9494
Non-German, Pure 47 33.88
German, Pure 37 37.78
0.5815 0.5825
UNDERPRICING Non-German, Broad 75 46.85
German, Broad 103 58.37
0.2583 0.6183
(in %)
Non-German, Narrow 63 47.13
German, Narrow 76 49.86
0.8023 0.9157
Non-German, Pure 47 37.54
German, Pure 37 41.25
0.7582 0.8287
23Table 3 - continued
p-value p-value VARIABLE Obs. Mean
(t-test) (Wilcoxon)
PANEL C: Pre-IPO venture capital ¯nancing
No. of VC FUNDS Non-German, Broad 75 3.79
German, Broad 103 1.92
0.0000*** 0.0000***
Non-German, Narrow 63 3.11
German, Narrow 76 1.62
0.0001*** 0.0000***
Non-German, Pure 47 2.81
German, Pure 37 1.84
0.0280** 0.0017***
No. of VC FIRMSa Non-German, Broad 75 3.16
German, Broad 103 1.78
0.0004*** 0.0000***
Non-German, Narrow 63 2.41
German, Narrow 76 1.42
0.0006*** 0.0000***
Non-German, Pure 47 2.02
German, Pure 37 1.49
0.0622* 0.0099***
SYNDICATION Non-German, Broad 75 0.72
German, Broad 103 0.45
0.0002*** 0.0003***
(funds' level)
Non-German, Narrow 63 0.75
German, Narrow 76 0.32
0.0000*** 0.0000***
Non-German, Pure 47 0.72
German, Pure 37 0.35
0.0006*** 0.0007***
No. of pre-IPO Non-German, Broad 53 2.19
German, Broad 90 1.54
0.0066*** 0.0016***
INVESTMENT ROUNDS
Non-German, Narrow 47 2.02
German, Narrow 67 1.45
0.0083*** 0.0010***
Non-German, Pure 33 2.27
German, Pure 25 2.28
0.9832 0.6540
STAGE in which Non-German, Broad 59 1.05
German, Broad 91 1.37
0.0138** 0.0102**
VC ENTEREDb
Non-German, Narrow 53 1.04
German, Narrow 67 1.46
0.0021*** 0.0018***
Non-German, Pure 37 0.62
German, Pure 28 0.71
0.4381 0.4379
Pre-IPO DURATIONc Non-German, Broad 59 25.15
German, Broad 91 16.10
0.0106** 0.0001***
(months)
Non-German, Narrow 53 23.28
German, Narrow 66 14.05
0.0049*** 0.0001***
Non-German, Pure 37 30.63
German, Pure 28 26.72
0.4257 0.0862*
atwo funds of one VC ¯rm are considered as a single unit, bthree di®erent stages are considered: start-up (0),
expansion (1), bridge (2), cthe duration of the pre-IPO venture capital equity ¯nancing
24Table 3 - continued
p-value p-value
VARIABLE Obs. Mean
(t-test) (Wilcoxon)
PANEL D: Venture capitalists' behavior at the IPO
LOCK > 6 Non-German, Broad 73 0.33
German, Broad 96 0.47
0.0652* 0.0675*
Non-German, Narrow 62 0.24
German, Narrow 72 0.49
0.0030*** 0.0037***
Non-German, Pure 46 0.28
German, Pure 36 0.56
0.0133** 0.0129**
Percent
Pre-IPO SHARE, All VCs Non-German, Broad 75 38.31
German, Broad 103 27.67
0.0042*** 0.0019***
Non-German, Narrow 63 32.62
German, Narrow 76 20.68
0.0004*** 0.0001***
Non-German, Pure 47 32.76
German, Pure 37 26.72
0.1594 0.1058
Pre-IPO ¸ 50 %, All VCsd Non-German, Broad 75 29.33
German, Broad 103 10.68
0.0028*** 0.0016***
Non-German, Narrow 63 17.46
German, Narrow 76 6.58
0.0550* 0.0462**
Non-German, Pure 47 12.77
German, Pure 37 10.81
0.7850 0.7848
Post-IPO SHARE, All VCs Non-German, Broad 75 23.42
German, Broad 103 15.28
0.0009*** 0.0004***
Non-German, Narrow 63 19.18
German, Narrow 76 10.48
0.0000*** 0.0000***
Non-German, Pure 47 18.79
German, Pure 37 13.43
0.0359** 0.0445**
Post-IPO ¸ 50 %, All VCse Non-German, Broad 75 9.33
German, Broad 103 3.88
0.1633 0.1371
Non-German, Narrow 63 3.17
German, Narrow 76 0.00
0.1590 0.1190
Non-German, Pure 47 4.26
German, Pure 37 0.00
0.1595 0.2068
Pre-IPO SHARE, Lead VC Non-German, Broad 75 24.40
German, Broad 103 23.17
0.6863 0.3511
Non-German, Narrow 63 22.58
German, Narrow 76 18.20
0.1229 0.0555*
Non-German, Pure 47 23.64
German, Pure 37 23.07
0.8816 0.8676
dFraction of ¯rms in which VC ¯rms as a group hold 50 % or more of the equity prior to the IPO. eFraction of ¯rms
in which VC ¯rms as a group hold 50 % or more of the equity after the IPO.
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p-value p-value
VARIABLE Obs. Mean
(t-test) (Wilcoxon)
Post-IPO SHARE, Non-German, Broad 75 15.31
German, Broad 103 12.70
0.2000 0.0421**
Lead VC
Non-German, Narrow 63 14.02
German, Narrow 76 8.93
0.0031*** 0.0017***
Non-German, Pure 47 14.26
German, Pure 37 11.23
0.1802 0.1444
RETAINED SHARES, f Non-German, Broad 75 80.91
German, Broad 103 72.23
0.0393** 0.0837*
All VCs
Non-German, Narrow 63 78.52
German, Narrow 76 72.44
0.1745 0.5325
Non-German, Pure 47 79.05
German, Pure 37 71.40
0.1908 0.5711
RETAINED SHARESfg Non-German, Broad 52 72.47
German, Broad 75 61.87
0.0356** 0.0200**
All VCs (when selling)
Non-German, Narrow 48 71.81
German, Narrow 52 59.72
0.0177** 0.0176**
Non-German, Pure 37 73.39
German, Pure 27 60.81
0.0553* 0.1102
RETAINED SHARES,f Non-German, Broad 75 80.50
German, Broad 103 71.88
0.0530* 0.1106
Lead VC
Non-German, Narrow 63 78.51
German, Narrow 76 72.30
0.1809 0.4696
Non-German, Pure 47 79.09
German, Pure 37 71.26
0.1931 0.5437
FIRMS WITH SELLINGh Non-German, Broad 75 69.33
German, Broad 103 72.82
0.6165 0.6129
Non-German, Narrow 63 76.19
German, Narrow 76 68.42
0.3097 0.3119
Non-German, Pure 47 78.72
German, Pure 37 72.97
0.5489 0.5414
fpre-IPO shareholdings = 100 %, gfor the group of ¯rms where venture capitalists give up shares at the IPO,
hfraction of ¯rms in which venture capitalists give up shares at the IPO
26Table 4: Number of VC funds per ¯rm at the IPO
For each of the three de¯nitions of VC (broad, narrow, and pure), this table depicts the number (the percentage)
of ¯rms which are ¯nanced by 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and, ¯nally, by more than 5 venture capital funds.
Number of VCs 1 2 3 4 5 5+
Broad de¯nition of VC
78 37 18 20 12 13
(43.82%) (20.79%) (10.11%) (11.24%) ( 6.74%) (7.31%)
Narrow de¯nition of VC
68 28 22 12 2 7
(48.92%) (20.14%) (15.83%) (8.63%) (1.44%) (5.04%)
Pure VC
37 19 16 5 1 6
(44.05%) (22.62%) (19.05%) (5.95%) (1.19%) (7.14%)
Table 5: Pre- and post-IPO holdings by the group of venture capitalists
This table provides the fraction of venture-backed ¯rms in which the group of venture capitalists holds more than
50 % of the equity before the IPO and after the IPO for all three de¯nitions of VC (broad, narrow, and pure).
Further, it shows the average pre-IPO and post-IPO equity holdings of the group of venture capitalists. The results
are compared to Megginson and Weiss (1991) and Barry et. al (1990), denoted by MW and BM.
pre-IPO¸ 50% post-IPO¸ 50 average pre-IPO average post-IPO
Broad de¯nition of VC 18.4 % 6.1 % 32.0 % 18.6 %
Narrow de¯nition of VC 11.5 % 1.4 % 26.0 % 14.4 %
Pure VC 11.6 % 2.3 % 29.6 % 16.2 %
MWa 28.0 % 8.4 % 36.6 % 26.3 %
BMb 24.4 % n.a. 34.3 % 24.6 %
a Megginson and Weiss, 1991, b Barry et al., 1990.
27Table 6: The venture capitalists' behavior in the course of the IPO
This table presents the fractions of venture-backed ¯rms in which the venture capitalists' shareholdings
(i) decrease, (ii) do not change and (iii) increase during the IPO for all three de¯nitions of VC (broad,
narrow, and pure). It depicts the average changes for each group as well.
Percent of ¯rms Average change
Broad Narrow Pure Broad Narrow Pure
de¯nition de¯nition de¯nition de¯nition de¯nition de¯nition
Change in shareholdings
Decrease 70.9 % 72.0 % 76.2 % -33.8 % -34.5 % -31.9 %
No change 23.5 % 23.0 % 20.2 % 0% 0% 0%
Increase 5.6 % 5.0 % 3.6 % + 1654.3 % +2343.1% +5252.4%
Table 7: The venture capitalists' reputation
This table shows the average reputation coe±cient of lead VC ¯rms from Germany and abroad
for all three de¯nitions of VC (broad, narrow, and pure). The reputation coe±cient depends
equally on the size and the age of the VC ¯rm. The reputation scale ranges from 1 to 5,
where 1 is the best and 5 the worst reputation. We conduct a standard two-sided t-test
(allowing for unequal variances) to test for di®erences in means between the subgroups of lead
VC ¯rms from Germany and abroad. Additionally, we use the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test to
test for the equality of medians. Three asterisks indicate signi¯cance at the 1 % level or better.
p-value p-value
Obs Mean
(t-test) (Wilcoxon)
REPUTATION Non-German, Broad 75 3.09
German, Broad 103 4.00
0.0000*** 0.0006***
COEFFICIENT
Non-German, Narrow 63 2.37
German, Narrow 76 3.60
0.0000*** 0.0000***
Non-German, Pure 47 2.40
German, Pure 37 3.46
0.0002*** 0.0005***
28Table 8: Hazard rate models
This table depicts the results of hazard rate models for the dependent variable: duration of
the pre-IPO venture capital ¯nancing (for three de¯nitions of VC: broad, narrow, and pure).
The choice of explanatory variables in each model is based on the optimization of the Akaike
information criterion. If the estimated coe±cient is higher than 0, then this variable increases
the hazard ratio, and vice versa. One, two and three asterisks indicate signi¯cance at the 10
%, 5 % and 1 % level or better.
Dependent Variable: Duration of the pre-IPO venture capital ¯nancing
Weibull Exponential Cox
Explanatory Variables Coe±cients
Broad VC
GERMAN VC 0.47*** 0.46*** 0.48***
START-UP -0.80*** -0.78*** -0.77***
INTERNET 0.79*** 0.77*** 0.77***
MEDIA & ENTERTAINMENT 0.83*** 0.82*** 0.87***
TELECOMMUNICATIONS -0.63* -0.61* -0.58
Number of ¯rms 150 150 150
Model p-value 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000***
Narrow VC
GERMAN VC 0.56*** 0.51*** 0.59***
START-UP -0.42* -0.36 -0.48*
INTERNET 1.15*** 0.93*** 1.18***
MEDIA & ENTERTAINMENT 1.96*** 1.62*** 1.92***
Number of ¯rms 119 119 119
Model p-value 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000***
Pure VC
INTERNET 1.25*** 0.67* 1.30***
MEDIA & ENTERTAINMENT 2.53*** 1.43** 2.86***
Number of ¯rms 65 65 65
Model p-value 0.0007*** 0.0599* 0.0004***
29Table 9: Retained shares by the venture capitalists
This table depicts the results from the Tobit regressions for the dependent variable: fraction of old shares retained by the group of VCs beyond the IPO (for three de¯nitions of VC:
broad, narrow, and pure). We use two di®erent versions of the Huber-White-sandwich robust estimator of the variance in place of the conventional MLE variance estimator. In the ¯rst
approach the general version allowing any not independent observations is used. In the second approach, we allow observations to be not independent within a cluster that is based on
the branch and the market situation (we have 18 clusters, based on 9 branches and a dummy variable indicating hot vs. cold issue), but they must be independent between clusters.
One, two and three asterisks indicate signi¯cance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level or better. The number of asterisks (alternatively: the value of the Wald Â2 and the model p-value) in
parentheses indicates the results from the second approach when di®erences between the two approaches occur.
Dependent Variable: Fraction of old shares retained by the group of VCs beyond the IPO (in %)
Broad VC
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
CONSTANT 66.8*** 60.4*** 62.2*** 63.2*** 63.1*** 51.5*** 48.6*** 49.4*** 50.6*** 52.3***
Market situation
HOT ISSUE 12.7*(***) 11.6*(**) 12.5(**) 12.4*(***) 12.3*(***) 12.8*(***) 10.9(**) 11.2(**) 12.7*(***) 12.7*(***)
Firm characteristics / Uncertainty
BOOKB. RANGEa 9.4 7.7 37.4 12.5 13.2 17.6 9.4 43.5 17.2 18.7
AGEb -0.6*** -0.6** -0.4*( ) -0.6**(***) -0.6**(***) -0.5** -0.5** -0.4 -0.5** -0.5**
MARKET VALUEc 10.8 11.8 10.4 11.1 11.8 15.8 16.4 15.2 15.1 17.1
Signaling / Certi¯cation
DS REP. MINd -2.6** -2.6** -2.6**(***) -2.6**(***) -2.6**(***) -2.7**(***) -2.8**(***) -2.7**(***) -2.7**(***) -2.6**(***)
UND. REP. MINe 2.2*() 2.2*() 1.9 2.3*() 2.3*() 2.3*() 2.0 1.8 2.4*() 2.3*()
LOCK DURATIONf 2.8*** 2.7*** 2.4**(***) 2.8*** 2.8*** 2.7*** 2.7*** 2.2**(***) 2.7*** 2.7***
VC reputation / Pre-IPO VC ¯nancing
NUMBER VC FIRMS 1.4 2.2**(*)
SYNDICATION -4.2 0.1
Pre-IPO DURATIONb 0.5 1.1
Pre-IPO SHARE, Allg -0.01 0.03
Pre-IPO SHARE, Leadg -0.03 -0.0004
GERMAN VC -12.2** -9.3*() -11.7**(*) -11.0**(*) -10.9**()
REPUT. COEF.h 0.8 1.5 1.8 0.8 0.7
WaldÂ2 40.57 39.93 29.29 39.47 39.31 36.39 39.95 28.64 36.55 36.31
(255.51) (256.42) (837.60) (258.33) (257.83) (255.40) (342.06) (167.99) (137.42) (131.79)
Model p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006(0.0000) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0007(0.0000) 0.0000 0.0000
174 obs. (regr. 3 and 8: 146 obs.)
3
0Table 9 - continued
Dependent Variable: Fraction of old shares retained by the group of VCs beyond the IPO (in %)
Narrow VC
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
CONSTANT 67.1*** 66.5*** 65.9*** 73.7*** 72.6*** 56.2*** 58.0*** 57.0*** 63.5*** 65.2***
Market situation
HOT ISSUE 10.2 10.2 8.4 9.3 9.3 10.4(*) 10.0 8.1 9.9(*) 9.6(*)
Firm characteristics / Uncertainty
BOOKB. RANGEa -24.5 -25.1 -5.0 -23.8 -21.1 -25.3 -23.2 2.13 -19.1 -16.8
AGEb -0.4* -0.4* -0.3 -0.4*() -0.4 -0.4 -0.4*() -0.3 -0.4*() -0.3
MARKET VALUEc 37.5** 37.5** 41.7** 37.5** 40.8** 41.7** 41.9** 47.6** 43.0** 45.7**
Signaling / Certi¯cation
DS REP. MINd -2.6**(***) -2.6** -2.0* -2.6**(***) -2.7**(***) -2.6** -2.6** -1.9 -2.6** -2.6**(***)
UND. REP. MINe 2.6*(**) 2.6*(**) 1.9 2.4(*) 2.5(*) 2.8*(**) 2.7* 1.9 2.6(*) 2.6(*)
LOCK DURATIONf 1.7(**) 1.7(**) 1.5(**) 1.7(**) 1.7(***) 1.6(**) 1.6(**) 1.3(*) 1.6(**) 1.6(**)
VC reputation / Pre-IPO VC ¯nancing
NUMBER VC FIRMS 0.4 1.3
SYNDICATION 0.1 4.3
Pre-IPO DURATIONb -0.1 0.6
Pre-IPO SHARE, Allg -0.1 -0.1
Pre-IPO SHARE, Leadg -0.2 -0.2
GERMAN VC -5.6 -5.3 -7.2 -7.3 -6.1
REPUT. COEF.h 1.6 1.3 0.8 0.7 0.7
Wald Â2 27.70 27.12 20.07 29.18 30.22 28.06 28.62 21.59 28.28 30.23
(207.37) (209.87) (363.94) (205.67) (200.22) (415.49) (371.99) (260.05) (363.39) (330.96)
Model p-value 0.0011 0.0013 0.0175 0.0006 0.0004 0.0009 0.0008 0.0103 0.0009 0.0004
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
135 obs. (regr. 3 and 8: 115 obs.)
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Dependent Variable: Fraction of old shares retained by the group of VCs beyond the IPO (in %)
Pure VC
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
CONSTANT 50.3**(***) 52.2*** 44.8** 63.9*** 61.6*** 44.2**(***) 47.4*** 40.8** 57.9*** 57.1***
Market situation
HOT ISSUE 17.7**(***) 17.3**(***) 15.9(**) 16.9**(***) 17.0**(***) 19.0**(***) 18.5**(***) 16.2(*) 18.6**(***) 18.5**(***)
Firm characteristics / Uncertainty
BOOKB. RANGEa 2.9 3.2 38.3 -8.9 -3.8 10.6 11.9 50.6 1.9 4.7
AGEb -0.7*** -0.8*** -0.6 -0.8*** -0.7**(***) -0.7*** -0.7*** -0.7 -0.7*** -0.7**(***)
MARKET VALUEc 57.7*** 56.4*** 64.0*** 55.8*** 60.2*** 61.9*** 60.2*** 69.0*** 60.7*** 64.5***
Signaling / Certi¯cation
DS REP. MINd -1.9 -2.0 -1.1 -2.2*() -2.2* -1.6 -1.7 -0.5 -1.8 -1.9
UND. REP. MINe 4.6*** 4.5*** 3.4**(*) 4.6*** 4.6*** 4.8*** 4.7*** 3.6**(*) 4.9*** 4.9***
LOCK DURATIONf 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 -0.0 0.2 0.2
VC reputation / Pre-IPO VC ¯nancing
NUMBER VC FIRMS 0.7 1.0
SYNDICATION 2.1 3.8
Pre-IPO DURATIONb 1.2 1.2
Pre-IPO SHARE, Allg -0.2(*) -0.2
Pre-IPO SHARE, Leadg -0.3 -0.3
GERMAN VC -6.7 -7.2 -8.0 -8.8(*) -7.7
REPUT. COEF.h -1.3 -1.6 -2.1 -2.1 -1.8
Wald Â2 51.30 49.35 34.23 50.59 49.88 46.65 45.95 31.83 47.32 46.60
(99.04) (103.32) (132.05) (121.82) (94.01) (98.51) (97.66) (213.07) (108.66) (92.98)
Model p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002(0.0000) 0.0000 0.0000
81 obs. (regr. 3 and 8: 62 obs.)
aBookbuilding range refers to the width of the bookbuilding range: (rangemax-rangemin)/middle of the range. bIn years. cMarket value at the bookbuilding price, in Bil. Euros. dThe
reputation of the designated sponsor with the worst reputation. The reputation scale ranges from 1 to 10, where 1 is the best and 10 the worst reputation. eThe reputation of the
lead underwriter (if several lead underwriters: the reputation of that one with the worst reputation). The reputation scale ranges from 1 to 10, where 1 is the best and 10 the worst
reputation. fthe length of the committed lock-up period in months. gIn %. hReputation of the lead VC. The reputation scale ranges from 1 to 5, where 1 is the best and 5 the worst
reputation.
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2Table 10: Post-IPO shareholdings of the venture capitalists
This table depicts the results from the Tobit regressions for the dependent variable: fraction held by the group of VCs after the IPO (for three de¯nitions of VC: broad, narrow, and
pure). We use two di®erent versions of the Huber-White-sandwich robust estimator of the variance in place of the conventional MLE variance estimator. In the ¯rst approach the general
version allowing any not independent observations is used. In the second approach, we allow observations to be not independent within a cluster that is based on the branch and the
market situation (we have 18 clusters, based on 9 branches and a dummy variable indicating hot vs. cold issue), but they must be independent between clusters. One, two and three
asterisks indicate signi¯cance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level or better. The number of asterisks (alternatively: the value of the Wald Â2) in parentheses indicates the results from the
second approach when di®erences between the two approaches occur.
Dependent Variable: Fraction held by the group of VCs after the IPO (in %)
Broad VC
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
CONSTANT -1.8 -2.2 -1.6 -1.9 -2.2 -5.2*(**) -4.9*(***) -4.0(*) -4.6(**) -5.2*(***)
Market situation
HOT ISSUE 2.8*(***) 2.5(***) 3.3(***) 2.8*(***) 2.8*(***) 2.6(***) 2.2(**) 3.0(***) 2.7(***) 2.5(**)
Firm characteristics / Uncertainty
BOOKB. RANGEa -3.7 -5.1 -1.0 -3.6 -2.8 -2.6 -5.2 -0.4 -3.1 -1.7
AGEb -0.1*** -0.1*** -0.1*(**) -0.1*** -0.1*** -0.1**(***) -0.1**(***) -0.1*(**) -0.1*** -0.1**(***)
MARKET VALUEc 7.2*** 7.9*** 7.0*** 7.2*** 7.8*** 8.0*** 8.6*** 7.8*** 8.0*** 8.9***
Signaling / Certi¯cation
DS REP. MINd -0.4* -0.4*(**) -0.5*(**) -0.4*(**) -0.4* -0.5** -0.5** -0.5*(**) -0.4*(**) -0.5**
UND. REP. MAXe 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
LOCK DURATIONf 0.3**(***) 0.3**(***) 0.2*(**) 0.3**(***) 0.3**(***) 0.2**(***) 0.2**(***) 0.2(**) 0.2**(***) 0.2**(***)
VC reputation / Pre-IPO VC ¯nancing
Pre-IPO SHARE, Allg 0.6*** 0.6*** 0.6*** 0.6*** 0.6*** 0.6*** 0.6*** 0.6*** 0.6*** 0.6***
NUMBER VC FIRMS 0.5**() 0.6**(*)
SYNDICATION -0.1 0.8
Pre-IPO DURATIONb 0.2 0.3
Pre-IPO SHARE, Leadg -0.04 -0.07
GERMAN VC -1.8* -1.4 -1.8 -1.8* -1.5
REPUT. COEF.h 0.5 0.6* 0.4 0.4 0.6(*)
Wald Â2 960.8 1104.5 535.8 889.7 1111.8 1194.6 1325.6 628.0 1038.2 1462.0
(1816.0) (2323.0) (1377.2) (1250.5) (2507.6) (1501.0) (2589.7) (1659.1) (1408.8) (4262.6)
Model p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
174 obs. (regr. 3 and 8: 146 obs.)
3
3Table 10 - continued
Dependent Variable: Fraction held by the group of VCs after the IPO (in %)
Narrow VC
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
CONSTANT -0.3 0.4 0.6 1.1 -0.0 -3.2 -2.2 -2.1 -1.7 -2.6
Market situation
HOT ISSUE 3.1**(***) 2.7*(**) 3.5*(**) 3.0*(***) 3.1**(***) 3.3**(***) 2.9*(**) 3.5*(**) 3.2*(***) 3.2**
Firm characteristics / Uncertainty
BOOKB. RANGEa -7.7 -7.4 -3.9 -6.1 -4.2 -7.5 -6.3 -1.3 -4.1 -2.8
AGEb -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.07*() -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.06 -0.03
MARKET VALUEc 7.6*** 7.9*** 7.8*** 7.5*** 9.4*** 8.7*** 9.3*** 9.6*** 9.2*** 10.9***
Signaling / Certi¯cation
DS REP. MINd -0.4*(**) -0.5** -0.4(*) -0.4*(**) -0.4** -0.4*(**) -0.4*(**) -0.3 -0.4(**) -0.4*(**)
UND. REP. MINe 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4
LOCK DURATIONf 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
VC reputation / Pre-IPO VC ¯nancing
Pre-IPO SHARE, Allg 0.5*** 0.5*** 0.5*** 0.5*** 0.6*** 0.5*** 0.5*** 0.5*** 0.5*** 0.6***
NUMBER VC FIRMS 1.0 1.2*()
SYNDICATION 1.9 2.8**(*)
Pre-IPO DURATIONb 0.6 0.7
Pre-IPO SHARE, Leadg -0.1 -0.2
GERMAN VC -1.9*(**) -2.1*(**) -2.9** -2.6** -1.9(**)
REPUT. COEF.h 0.2 0.1 -0.2 -0.1 0.1
Wald Â2 265.57 326.57 188.80 216.17 323.13 264.07 341.47 175.84 194.17 347.67
(807.13) (2716.68) (234.31) (301.63) (1061.19) (472.72) (2101.69) (218.66) (364.64) (925.91)
Model p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
135 obs. (regr. 3 and 8: 115 obs.)
3
4Table 10 - continued
Dependent Variable: Fraction held by the group of VCs after the IPO (in %)
Pure VC
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
CONSTANT -4.0 -2.6 -2.1 -1.7 -2.6 -6.8 -4.7 -4.5 -4.0 -4.7
Market situation
HOT ISSUE 5.9*** 5.4**(***) 7.7*** 5.8**(***) 5.8*** 6.1*** 5.6**(***) 7.6**(***) 6.1**(***) 6.0***
Firm characteristics / Uncertainty
BOOKB. RANGEa -7.2 -6.6 -11.5 -7.8 -5.5 -4.4 -3.1 -4.9 -3.6 -1.8
AGEb -0.1** -0.1** -0.2**(*) -0.1** -0.1*(**) -0.1** -0.1*(**) -0.2** -0.1** -0.1*(**)
MARKET VALUEc 13.9*** 12.9*** 13.3*** 12.7*** 14.4*** 15.1*** 13.8*** 15.0*** 13.9*** 15.6***
Signaling / Certi¯cation
DS REP. MINd -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3
UND. REP. MINe 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.5
LOCK DURATIONf 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1
VC reputation / Pre-IPO VC ¯nancing
Pre-IPO SHARE, Allg 0.5*** 0.5*** 0.4*** 0.5*** 0.6*** 0.5*** 0.5*** 0.4*** 0.5*** 0.6***
NUMBER VC FIRMS 0.9 1.1
SYNDICATION 1.8 2.6*
Pre-IPO DURATIONb 1.2 1.2
Pre-IPO SHARE, Leadg -0.1 -0.1
GERMAN VC -2.5*(**) -2.7*(***) -4.1** -3.1**(***) -2.7*(***)
REPUT. COEF.h -0.1 -0.3 -0.7 -0.4 -0.3
Wald Â2 127.12 195.92 170.14 104.39 185.32 121.52 183.78 169.66 97.29(258.96) 173.43
(197.40) (525.92) (569.84) (150.08) (266.72) (312.87) (661.00) (387.91) (258.96) (318.06)
Model p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
81 obs. (regr. 3 and 8: 62 obs.)
aBookbuilding range refers to the width of the bookbuilding range: (rangemax-rangemin)/middle of the range. bIn years. cMarket value at the bookbuilding price, in Bil. Euros. dThe
reputation of the designated sponsor with the worst reputation. The reputation scale ranges from 1 to 10, where 1 is the best and 10 the worst reputation. eThe reputation of the
lead underwriter (if several lead underwriters: the reputation of that one with the worst reputation). The reputation scale ranges from 1 to 10, where 1 is the best and 10 the worst
reputation. fthe duration of the committed lock-up period in months. gIn %. hReputation of the lead VC. The reputation scale ranges from 1 to 5, where 1 is the best and 5 the worst
reputation.
3
5Table 11: Behavior of German venture capitalists
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS Method Explained by
Shorter pre-IPO VC ¯nancing descriptive statistics, hazard rate models grandstanding, value-added
Smaller o®ering size descriptive statistics grandstanding
Lower VC holdings descriptive statistics, Tobit regressions grandstanding
Lower syndication descriptive statistics grandstanding, value-added
Di®erent sectoral structure of portfolios descriptive statistics value-added
More later stage ¯nancing descriptive statistics value-added
Larger selling intensity at the IPO descriptive statistics, Tobit regressions value-added, certi¯cation / signaling
Longer committed lock-up period descriptive statistics certi¯cation / signaling
Higher underpricing (not signif.) descriptive statistics grandstanding, certi¯cation / signaling
Descriptive statistics - section 3, hazard rate models - section 4.1, Tobit regressions - section 4.2.
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